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Abstract
With the collapse of the communist regimes, the post-socialist countries are facing the problem of
building new legal and institutional systems which will adequately address the needs of the markets.
They also try to implement new reforms. But the transition towards economic and market reforms
across the bloc has been very uneven, producing the countries-winners, countries-laggards, and
countries-losers. There have been some attempts to explain that unevenness from the temporal path
dependency perspective and from geographic proximity perspective. Can we explain this unevenness
better drawing upon the theory of institutional isomorphism? 
This paper is not ambitious and built exclusively on literature review. It attempts to borrow from
some middle-range social theories of institution building and, especially, the theory of institutional
isomorphism by DiMaggio and Powell. It shows that some parts of the bloc seem to be surprisingly
isomorphic. The paper suggests an explanation of the possible causes and applicability of the
phenomenon of isomorphism in the post-Soviet bloc. 
In particular, it: 1) contrasts the facts of the transformation with the theory of institutional and
organizational isomorphism, 2) makes a fair causal comparison with other explanations, 3) claims
the adequate causal depth for the explanation, 4) points at an adequate causal mechanism of the
transformation. 
Kurzfassung
Mit dem Zusammenbruch der kommunistischen Regime stehen die post-sozialistischen Länder for
dem Problem des Aufbaus neuer rechtlicher und institutioneller Systeme, welche den
Notwendigkeiten des Marktes gerecht werden. Darüber hinaus werden auch neue Reformen
umgesetzt. Doch der Übergang zu ökonomischen und Marktreformen war in dieser Ländergruppe
sehr ungleich und hat Sieger, Nachzügler und Verlierer produziert. Es gab bereits einige Versuche
diese Unterschiede aus einer zeitlichen, pfadabhängigen Perspektive und aus der Perspektive der
geographischen Nähe zu erklären. Können wir dieses Phänomen der Unterschiedlichkeit besser unter
Bezugnahme auf die Theorie des institutionellen Isomorphismus erklären?
Dieses Papier ist nicht ambitioniert und ist ausschließlich auf einen Überblick über die Literatur
gestützt. Es versucht sich auf einige sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien mittlerer Reichweite der
Entstehung von Institutionen und, im Speziellen, auf die Theorie des institutionellen Isomorphismus
von DiMaggio und Powell zu stützen. Es zeigt, daß einige Teile der Ländergruppe überraschend
isomorph sind. Das Papier unterbreitet eine Erklärung der möglichen Ursachen und der
Anwendbarkeit des Phänomens des Isomorphismus im post-sovietischen Block.
Im speziellen werden die Fakten der Transformation mit der Theorie des institutionellen und
organisatorischen Isomorphismus kontrastiert (1.); weiters wird ein ausgewogener Vergleich mit
konkurrierenden Erklärungen angestellt (2.); dann wird behauptet, daß die angebotene Erklärung die
ausreichende kausale Tiefe aufweist (3.), und schließlich wird der angemessene Kausalmechanismus
der Transformation aufgezeigt (4.).
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Domino Theory:
A theory that if one nation becomes Communist-controlled
the neighboring nations will also become Communist-controlled.
Even Newton's theory of motion ignores friction. 
Peter M. Blau 
A. Introduction and Hypotheses of the Theory 
With the collapse of the communist regimes, the post-Socialist countries are facing the problem of
building new legal and institutional systems which will adequately address the needs of the markets.
At the same time, there is a debate among sovietologists as of identification of the causal mechanism
of building new legal and democratic systems, and what influences the choice of East European
policy-makers. Even upon a cursory observation, it becomes obvious that some countries have clearly
succeeded in the task more than the others. This paper attempts to borrow from some middle range
social theories of institution building and, especially, the theory of institutional isomorphism by
DiMaggio and Powell. It argues that a possible parallel can be made between the theory of
institutional isomorphism within a country (or within an institutional field) and a number of countries,
or a region as a whole. Considering the uneven development of the post-Socialist countries during the
transition period and applying the theory of institutional isomorphism on the state level, we can
observe the phenomenon of state isomorphism. The theory also shows that perhaps a significantly
valid prediction can be made about future unfolding of the transition in the region. 
To begin with, Max Weber should be mentioned as the father of bureaucratization theory. According
to Weber, bureaucratization arises primarily from increasing competition among capitalist firms and
business. That assumes that businesses are driven by a search for efficiency and control over their
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competition on the market and expansion of the market. The relation networks become extremely
complex with the expansion of the market, and bureaucracy arises in order to adequately manage
"more internal and boundary-spanning interdependencies." There is a problem with this explanation,
however, because it assumes that organizations function according to the established norms which
arise from necessity of activity coordination. In reality we observe that the rules are often violated and
decisions are unimplemented. 
Sociologists Meyer and Rowan in Institutionalized Organizations emphasize the second Weberian
explanation of institutional rise, according to which the cause of formal structure comes from the
legitimacy of rationalized formal structures (1983). That leads the authors to the conclusion that
formal organizations incorporate the rational institutional rules and try to conform to them. Further,
the authors hypothesize that as the society modernizes, institutional structures extend in a given
domain (46). 
Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell build on the Weberian concept of legitimacy and, considering the
Meyer and Rowan emphasis on conformity to the rules, present a more complete picture. They
introduce us to a theoretical foundation of the concept of institutional isomorphism. According to the
authors, when new organizations emerge, rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar
as they try to change them. Bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change occur as the
result of process that make organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient
(147). The difference between Weberian rationality in contrast of the DiMaggio and Powell
presentation is that Weberian actors think that it is important to try to achieve more efficiency, while
DiMaggio and Powell stress the actors' belief that efficiency stems from legitimacy, and legitimacy
stems from conformity to the "general" rules and norms, and, therefore, it is rational to conform in
order to gain efficiency. In other words, the practices the organizations resort to in order to maintain
their legitimacy stem from the actors' rational choice to appear legitimate, and that leads to
organizational isomorphism and homogeneity of organizational structures. In a sense, Weberian
efficiency may be called objective, while in reality, conformity to rules does not lead to efficiency
necessarily, though the actors think it does. 
A concept of organizational field, as it is developed by DiMaggio and Powell, has to be introduced at
this point. By organizational field, DiMaggio and Powell mean those organizations that constitute a
recognized area of institutional life. In our case, these are regulatory agencies, or legal systems, or
even the whole East European region. Within the organizational field, bureaucratization arises out of
structuration, when four conditions are present: 
2
1. interaction among organizations increases, (between Eastern and Western Europe, among the
Central Asia countries, but not, for instance, between the West and Central Asia countries), 
2. the rise of interorganizational structures of domination and coalition (the West dominating the
East), 
3. an increase in the information load with which organizations in the field must contend (as
increased communication between the West and the East by the mid 1980s, as the West and
Solidarity in Poland), 
4. the development of mutual awareness of a common enterprise (for example, the East European
countries desires to become the NATO and EU members). 
Once disparate organizations are structures in the same field, their drive to gain legitimacy becomes a
powerful force that leads them to become more similar to one another (DiMaggio&Powell, 148).
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leads to what the authors call the process isomorphism. This approach suggests that organizational
characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing comparability with environmental
characteristics (149). 
The authors begin by distinguishing two types of isomorphism competitive and institutional.
Organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional
legitimacy for social as well as economic fitness (150). More specifically the isomorphism results
through the three causal mechanism: 
1. coercive processes, from 
2. an attempt to resolve uncertainty, and from 
3. normative pressures of professionalization. 
B. Applicability of the Theory to the Developments In the
Post-Socialist Bloc 
A question at this point can be asked as to what extent the abovementioned theory helps to explain
variations in the legal and institutional development in the Post-Socialist societies? It can be argued
that there are some surprisingly discernible similarities between the DiMaggio and Powell framework
and the uneven development of Post-Socialist transition. In fact, the rate and extent to which reforms
were implemented in the Post-Socialist societies strongly correlates with the relative isomorphic
positions of those societies with respect to the West and each other. 
The major premise of this paper is a rather simple possibility of successful substituting the concept of
"organizations" for "states." We can see, for example, that the countries of Eastern and Western
Europe are displaying more isomorphism than there is between Russia and Western Europe or Russia
and Eastern Europe. At the same time, there is some isomorphism among the Asian countries, and
even less isomorphism between those countries and the West. 
It is useful to look at the progress the post-Socialist societies have made towards free markets and
democracy. Although in this paper we will not look at empirical data, we will trust instead the
literature and research of specialists in the area. So, for example, successful transition will be defined
as adoption of market reforms and shock therapy and democratization. There is a remarkable
similarity between the results of the transition so far, and the propositions which are provided by the
isomorphism theory. The pattern of legal and economic development and adoption of reforms within
the region is well-reflected in the conditions and causal mechanism specified by the isomorphism
theory. The countries, similarly to individual social actors, are influenced by the same causal
mechanisms. 
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Now, let us look at how the original conditions fit the facts of regional development: 
Condition I 
Before looking at the first condition, let us mention that it is not a secret that Western economists
played a significant role advising the model of shock therapy, which would have allegedly benefited
the countries in transition most, while from ideological point of view, the West was looking forward
to East European sharp break with its communist past. Let us look at the first condition of
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reforms – in other words, a leap towards capitalist institutional and market arrangements. 
To a large extent scholars agree that more economic reforms have been adopted in Eastern Europe
rather than in the Asian part of the former bloc. The same can be said about the rate of
democratization. According to the first condition of structuration, interaction among the actors must
increase for isomorphism to appear; in other words, there has to be an increase in the extent of
interaction among the organizations in the field. 
A case can be made that economic reforms were adopted to a larger extent in Eastern Europe than in
the post-Soviet bloc in part because East European countries had a closer historical and geographical
contact with the capitalist West (which satisfies our first requirement), plus the frameworks for those
reforms originated from the West (Western advisers) and were introduced with help of the West. In
comparison, the Asian countries adopted fewer reforms, while Russia falls in between. The data are
well summarized in Appendix A in A Politics of Institutional Choice by Frye). Countries which more
then less adopted shock therapy are Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and, to a lesser extent, Latvia. Kazakhstan represents an exception among the
Asian countries (but only with respect to economic reforms, not political), while it is clear that the
Eastern portion of the bloc, plus Georgia and Ukraine, adopted fewer reforms. Countries that are
located in between the Asian bloc and Eastern bloc, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, fall in
between on reform adoption. 
An excellent source to measure transition towards free markets is The index of Economic Freedom,
2000. The rankings range from 1 to 5, 4 to 5 corresponding to repressed, and 1 to 1.95 corresponding
to free. So, the mean for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Slovakia, and Croatia is 2.75., while the former Soviet republics (excluding the three Baltic States)
are ranked as "mostly unfree" with score from 3 to 3.95, and Bosnia and Belarus are ranked as
"repressed." 
To some extent, transition to free markets can be measured in terms of property rights, since solid
property rights must exist for markets to function. Property rights is one of the ten factors considered
in measuring economic freedom. Again, the mean for the nine republics (Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, and the three Baltic states) is 2.55, while it is 3.7 for the former
USSR (excluding, again, the Baltic states). 
As we can see, according to the first condition, there is a strong organizational field consisting of the
countries of Western and Eastern Europe inasmuch as the ties between the West and East are
historically and geographically closer than, (arguably) say, between Russia and Western Europe. That
may explain the difference in the extent of the adoption of shock therapy (recommended by the West)
and, generally, reform adoption. As we know, while Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Poland adopted shock therapy quite fast, Russia adopted it only partially, while the Asian bloc
countries largely ignored the policy. 
Condition II 
According to the second condition, there is a rise of interorganizational structures of domination and
patterns of coalition. An argument can be made that the East-European countries felt superiority of
the West, while Russia could not afford it because of some "pride considerations" factor, and the
Asian countries are even more West exclusive. With the collapse of the Communist regimes, Eastern
Europe felt more dominated by the West in all respects: technologically and economically as well as
intellectually. Russia, at the same time, did not feel much either intellectually or technologically
dominated by the West (considering the well developed Russian military complex). 
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Conditions III and IV 
Those conditions are very well shown in Subversive Institutions by Valerie Bunce. 
Condition 3 specifies an increase in information load within the field. Indeed, as Bunce notes in her
book, communication and informational exchange increased as early as 1970's with the advent of
Détente, which "reduced East-West conflict by recognizing Soviet-American equality, and rendered
more porous the cultural, economic, and political boundaries that had for so long isolated the eastern
from the western halves of Europe" (60). Similarly, Gale Stokes points out at increasing flow of
information between Western and Eastern Europe in the case of Solidarity movement in Poland (The
Walls Came Tumbling Down, 1991). 
Condition 4 states that there must be the development of mutual awareness of involvement in a
common enterprise. Clearly, to the extent that the East European countries plus the Baltic states are
desirous to join Western Europe, the European Community and, of course, NATO, there is indeed a
mutual awareness of a common enterprise and a unified Europe. Russia, however, still regards itself
more detached from Europe (and that is, perhaps, as much the fault of Europe as of Russia), not
mentioning Russia's downright hostility towards NATO expansion (Security and Defense and
Enlargement of the European Union, European Parliament, Briefing # 31). In other words, mutual
awareness of a common enterprise is less visible between Russia and the West, or the Asia and the
West, than between the East and the West. 
With regard to Eastern Europe, the 4th condition is best specified by Bunce in her book, where she
says: 
Demands for political change... tend to arise when two factors converge. The first is... the formation
of solidaristic and resourceful political groups that have shared economic, political and cultural
experiences; that have developed a common identity, a common set of goals [mutual enterprise], and
a common definition of enemy, and that are empowered by ideology and leadership (17). 
Ideology may as well have come to Eastern Europe from the West, since by ideology Bunce most
likely means the ideology of liberal and democratic reforms. Perception of a common enemy can be,
therefore, considered as a mutual goal. Hardly communist Russia was looked upon as a friend by the
West, and Eastern Europe was highly resentful of communism (Gale Stokes; Paul Kennedy, The Rise
and Fall of Empires, 1989). Already some presence of isomorphism within Eastern Europe is shown
in what Bunce calls the formation of "islands of autonomy" by the end of 1980s, such as Poland and
Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states (32). In particular, Bunce stresses that even before the
collapse, Eastern Europe was homogenized by the domination of the Soviet bloc. 
C. Causal Mechanism of Isomorphism 
As we could see, the four conditions are satisfied to a larger extent between Western Europe and East
Europe than between Asia and the West or Russia and the West. The difference in presence or
absence of those conditions alone, however, cannot account for the difference in policy adoption
across the Post-Soviet bloc. The conditions only give satisfactory environment for the four causal
mechanisms to occur, which lead to institutional isomorphism. The difference in the strength of those
conditions accounts in the difference of effectiveness of the causal mechanisms identified below, and
that, in turn, explains the difference in the extent of policy adoption and state isomorphism across the
bloc. 
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The first mechanism leading to institutional isomorphism is coercive isomorphism, which stems from
political influence and the problem of legitimacy. As DiMaggio and Powell explain: "Coercive
isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations [states] by
other organizations [states] upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the
society" (150). Perhaps, taking into consideration the proximity of Eastern and Western Europe (and
the four conditions in general), there was a perceptible element of coercion on the part of Western
Europe as to the rapid shift to the market economies. This coercive isomorphism does not have to be
necessarily explicit: "Such pressure can be felt as a force, as persuasion, or as invitation to join in
collusion" (DiMaggio and Powell, 150). Applying the theory, the shock therapy policy can be seen
from the fact that Western Europe was considered as dominating over Eastern Europe, as if Eastern
Europe were its "subsidiary." "Subsidiaries," writes DiMaggio, "must adopt practices, performance
evaluations, and budgetary plans that are comparable with the policies of the parent corporation
[state]" (151). 
Mimetic isomorphism is the second causal mechanism. According to mimetic isomorphism,
uncertainty is a powerful force behind imitation and institutional convergence. When organizational
technologies are poorly understood (March and Olsen, 1976), when goals are ambiguous, or when the
environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations [states] may model themselves on other
organizations [states] (DiMaggio and Powell, 151). The modeled states can serve as a convenient
source of practices that the borrowing states may use (151). Models can be diffused by organizations
[states] as consulting firms, such as, for instance, the influx of foreign advisers to the bloc. 
DiMaggio and Powell also point out at a very relevant point with respect to the relationship between
the West and the East: "Organizations," they say, "tend to model themselves after similar
organizations in their field that they perceive more legitimate and successful" (152). Indeed, the
alleged economic success of the West as it was and is perceived in the East cannot be
overemphasized. This point is not altogether new and was mentioned earlier by Meyer, who contends
that "it is easy to predict the organization of a newly emerging nation's administration without
knowing anything about the nation itself, since peripheral nations are far more isomorphic in
administrative and economic pattern" (qv. in DiMaggio and Powell, 152). As Bunce also points out,
"The key role in mobilized publics in many of the eastern transitions...[was] their widespread
assumption that leaving socialism would produce not just the democracy of the West but also its
prosperity" (Regional Differences in Democratization, 198). 
The last causal mechanism leading to isomorphism as identified by DiMaggio and Powell is normative
pressures. That source derives primarily from professionalization. This mechanism maybe not as
strongly pronounced as the first two with regards to Eastern and Western Europe, but it does not
mean that the mechanism has no validity. For example, the European Union has come to unifying
standards for its professionals in each field across the EU countries. The development of that is yet to
be seen in Eastern Europe if it is moving towards more isomorphism within itself and with the West
on the first two causal mechanisms (The Social Aspects of Enlargement of the European Union,
European Parliament, Briefing #29). 
It is important to stress that those causal mechanisms can proceed without any indication of increasing
efficiency in the state's performance. The states are driven by those mechanisms to adopt reforms and
simulate the more efficient examples (the West), but it does not mean that those policies are best for
the adopting states. In fact, there was some argument that perhaps Eastern Europe should have
proceeded with more cautiousness regarding shock therapy, and cultural factors must be taken into
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constitution in the midst of transition could ultimately undermine efforts to create a stable and liberal
constitutional order in the long run" (Holmes, When Less State Means Less, Freedom). Similar
concerns come from some political economists, such as Amsden. In her book The Market Meets Its
Match Amsden criticizes the shock therapy approach and its disregard for and waste of valuable
human capital. 
The Eastern European states internalize the implicit notion that more isomorphism with more efficient
Western states and among themselves will lead to more legitimacy in the eyes of the developed
capitalist world, and that feeling of being legitimate is by itself rewarding. To the extent that the state's
effectiveness could be enhanced, the reason will often be that states are rewarded for being similar to
one another. That is, of course, a rational thing to do, since this similarity can make it easier for an
organization [state] to transact with other organizations [states], to attract career-minded staff, to be
acknowledged as legitimate and reputable, and to fit into administrative categories that define
eligibility for... grants and contracts. Grants and contracts, or more simply, foreign aid and
investments, is exactly what Eastern Europe needed and still needs. Arguably, Russia needs foreign
aid too, but unlike Eastern Europe, Russia is still rich in natural resources and is not experiencing an
acute energy crisis. Could it be that Russia is less dependent on foreign aid than Eastern Europe is? 
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D. Hypotheses 
That point leads us to the first two hypotheses of isomorphic change offered by DiMaggio and
Powell: "The greater the dependence of an organization on another organization, the more similar it
will become to that organization in structure, climate, and behavioral focus" (154). It would be wrong
to consider dependence in economic terms alone. For example, Russia is definitely less dependent on
Western Europe in terms of military defense (in fact, it is absolutely independent). That case can
hardly be made with regard to Eastern Europe and the three Baltic states. The Baltic states experience
downright hostility towards Russia, and look westward for military protection, not mentioning their
desire to become NATO members (Russia and the Enlargement of the European Union, European
Parliament, Briefing #14). This position of dependence leads to isomorphic change. 
Hypothesis I is closely linked to Hypothesis II: "The greater the centralization of organization A's
resource supply, the greater the extent to which organization A will change isomorphically to
resemble the organizations on which it depends for resources" (154). A note should be made that the
first two hypotheses are derived directly from the coercive isomorphism. In fact, as Eastern Europe is
dependent on the West, the latter may demand (and it does) the introduction of reforms and shaping
legal institutions according to its own models. The IMF demands are particularly visible in the Russian
case, though these demands are largely ignored by the Russian government. If taken true, the
hypotheses make us question once again the extent of Russia's dependency on the West. 
Hypotheses III and IV are derived from mimetic isomorphism: "The more uncertain the relationship
between means and ends, and the more ambiguous the goals of an organization, the greater the extend
to which the organization will model itself after organizations that it perceives to be successful" (154
– 155). As it was mentioned before, the Western style capitalism was perceived as largely successful
in the eyes of the East. At the same time, in the East, the relationship between the means and ends
was indeed uncertain. Communism was destroyed, but the path towards possible alternatives was
vague. That also point at ambiguities of the goals. Similarly to DiMaggio and Powell, Meyer and
Rowan argue that organizations which lack well-defined technologies [transition technologies, or
technologies of building and operation a market economy] will import institutionalized rules and
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illegitimate in the eyes of the West and, later, the East, but lack of any legal or economic system in the
East was destabilizing and uncomfortable; therefore, the building (or in our case, borrowing)
institutional rules from the West was a quick way to gain legitimacy. The West expected the East to
establish free market economies as fast as possible. As DiMaggio and Powell see it, there are two
reasons in believing these hypotheses. The first reason is that borrowing organizations "find to their
advantage to meet expectations of important constituencies about how they should be design and run"
(155). The second reason is that conflict over organizational goals is repressed in the interest of
harmony. Interest of harmony can be seen in the interest of constructing a unified Europe. Many
instances of potential conflicts were not developed upon the Communist collapse, but instead were
settled peacefully (such as the dispute over Western boarder between Poland and Eastern Germany,
and in case of Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Hypotheses V and VI are built upon the third causal mechanism professionalization. According to the
hypotheses, more isomorphism will come if the participation in trade increases between and among
organizations, and organizations will rely more on academic credentials in choosing managerial staff
and personnel (155). As Eastern Europe adopted shock therapy to a larger extent than Russia and the
Asian bloc states, it allowed the flow of private investment and advent of Western businesses into the
region. Russia, as the case of partial reforms, did not allow foreign businesses to the same extent. For
example, there is not a single foreign bank in Russia even to this day, because it would create strong
competition with domestic banks. "The Soviet Union," says Brian Murray, "developed autarkic
economies closed to most foreign trade and investment" (Foreign Investment and Advice). There are
all indicators that the trade between Eastern Europe and Western Europe is more developed than the
trade between Western Europe and Russia. The last two hypotheses make one think about
relationship between the geographical location of the states and the possibility of isomorphism to
occur. For example, it is possible that trade is more difficult to establish between the Asian bloc states
and the West than the West and the East. Therefore, the borrowing of specialists is less likely in the
first case. Indeed, for the Hypotheses V and VI to be true, the first condition of structuration must be
present (interaction among organizations). Geographical distances may well inhibit such interaction. 
7
The theory of isomorphism emphasize the question of legitimization and conformity. The question of
legitimacy is an important one as organizations have to compromise between being highly efficient
and conforming to the norms. Incorporating norms and institutionalized elements is important because
"it protects the organization from having its conduct questioned," and thus the organization appears
legitimate (Institutionalized Organizations, 50). 
As Meyer and Rowan explain institutional isomorphism, organizations a) incorporate elements which
are legitimated externally, rather than in terms of efficiency, b) they employ external or ceremonial
assessment criteria to define the value of structural elements, c) dependence on externally fixed
institutions reduces turbulence and maintains stability (49). Conformity is still considered to be a
rational choice, though, unlike Weberian rationality, this one does not directly lead to efficiency. The
path lies through conformity first, because conformity means legitimacy. In other words, conformity
protects the state from having its conduct questioned. It becomes legitimate and uses its legitimacy to
strengthen its support and secure its survival. 
Thus, Meyer and Rowan come up with their proposition, which is similar to the theory of DiMaggio
and Powell: "Organizations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their formal
structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival" (53). The key words
here are societally legitimated rationalized. Meyer and Rowan offer to make a study of the loans
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institutionalization, and 2) the degree to which the organization structurally incorporates
environmental institutions (61). Are banks willing to lend more money to firms whose plans are
accompanied by econometric projections? Similarly, it can be asked whether Western banks and states
are willing to lend money to the countries which conform Western econometric expectations and meet
expected institutional requirements? 
E. The Importance of the Theory 
Now it is a time to ask: what is at stake here in offering an explanation from the perspective of
isomorphism? As Bunce notes, the idea of a unified Europe today is as strong as it has never been.
"European Union in the process of both deepening and widening and a NATO expanding eastward,"
and there is a possibility that "the Europe of the future will be united" (The Historical Origins of
East-West Divide, 275). Does the theory of institutional isomorphism have any explanatory and
predictive power in the case of post-Socialist transition? Is the theory valid if applied on the state
level? The facts from the Post-Socialist transition indicate that the theory might as well hold its
validity explaining state isomorphism. For example, East European and West European countries can
be said to form a unified institutional field, and Eastern Europe steadily moves away from Russia,
Asia, and the past (Socialism) towards more isomorphism with Western Europe. Or it can be said that
Eastern Europe moves faster towards Western-type economic and political arrangements than do
Russian and Asia. That is seen in the countries' 1) adoption of shock therapy and 2) the level and
speed of democratization, 3) openness of the market and Western specialists. 
Joel Hellman identifies Eastern Europe – Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia – as advanced in their reform adoption, following by Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Albania, and Romania (Winners Take All, 225, Table 5). Those countries scored highest on trade
liberalization, small scale privatization, financial reform, and enterprise restructuring (Hellman,
Constitutions and Economic Reform, 48, Table 1). The East European countries are identified as
transition leaders by other analysts as well (Regional Difference in Democratization; Politics of
Institutional Choice). Yugoslavia can be regarded as a possible outlier in terms of implementing
reforms, but even in that troubled region there is an advent of such Western ideas as democratization
and individual freedom. 
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It is amazing to what extent the fourth condition can be applied to Eastern Europe. There is no doubt
that the membership in the European Union is the ultimate goal of the East European countries. As
Mitchell Orenstein put it: "East-Central Europe has little choice but to join the capitalist world
system,"... and "East-Central Europe is oriented towards the provision of a set of goods whose
ultimate purpose is to qualify for membership in the European Union" (A Genealogy of Communist
Successor Parties in East-Central Europe, 481). 
It can be said, at the same time, that the Asian bloc countries form their own isomorphic field exactly
because they have little in common with the West but a lot in common with each other: lack of
democratization (more autocracy), they are ill-marketized, and still exclusive of Western professionals
(businesses). The causal mechanisms leading towards isomorphism with the West cannot work in the
Asian bloc countries inasmuch as the four conditions (with regard, again, to Western Europe) are not
pronounced. That is, there is little interaction between the Asian bloc countries and the West, the
Asian bloc countries do not see themselves as dominated by the West (perhaps, it is largely the
perception of their leadership), and there is little mutual awareness of a common enterprise between
the Asian bloc countries and Western Europe. At the same time, these states are grouped together,
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selling state assets. 
Countries such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and are typical laggards, having adopted partial
reforms, located, so to speak, in between, with Yugoslavia as an outlier (Winners Take All, 225; see
also Motyl, 1997). Interaction between those states and the West is very moderate and, to put mildly,
strained. In the Russian case, a lot of it has to do with the question of NATO expansion. The factor of
"Russian pride" is still existent (though it is hard to quantify), if not in the masses, but at least at the
leadership level, which might hinder interaction with the West, and, of course, recognition of Western
dominance. 
What can be said about the importance of the abovementioned theory of isomorphism and how it may
apply to the states during transition, in particular, Eastern Europe with regard to Western Europe? It
is possible that for some, the state isomorphism would be too obvious a thing to look at. In fact, the
facts of the transition so far, as well as the theory itself, cannot be divorced from many historical
accounts and geographical locations of the countries analyzed. For some analysts then, the faster
reform adoption rate in Eastern Europe is just a natural and inevitable fact given its relative proximity
to the West and historical ties. For example, as Bunce reminds us, "After the war, [economic and
ideological] differences took on clear-cut institutional forms, with Europe split along north-south and
east-west axes." Indeed, the West played a critical role in shaping developments of the East...so was
the East influential in the development of the west (The Historical Origins). There is a profound body
of literature on the question of cultural and geographical divide between Europe, Russia, and Asia
(Russia Between Europe and Asia). 
Applicability of the theory of isomorphism only stronger validates the cultural and geographical
explanations of the regional development variance through identification of causal mechanisms
through which isomorphism occurs. It does not disagree with cultural or historical explanations (in
fact, it is deeply embedded in them), but it also provides us with the detailed mechanism through
which historical and cultural factors are working. 
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F. Causal Depth As Necessity 
The theory of "state isomorphism" can be said to strengthen the importance of cultural explanation,
which is not so obvious to some analysts. But it does more than that: it provides an adequate causal
depth and identifies an adequate causal mechanism of the difference in the Post-Socialist development.
The idea of causal depth is well explained by Richard Miller in his book Fact and Method (1987). The
idea itself is often overlooked by social scientists. Indeed, it is somewhat elusive, but its importance
cannot be overemphasized. The problem is that due to an incorrect causal depth (too shallow or too
deep) social explanations are often meaningless. 
A well-known example – collapse of the Soviet Union – can show the importance of the "right" depth
for social explanation. Why did the USSR collapse? There are, of course, multiple causalities and
varieties of social explanations. For instance, some scientists stress the "Gorbachev factor" as one of
the causal contributors to the collapse, and undoubtedly there is some element of truth. It is also, for
example, true that the Soviet state was in financial crisis due to the military overspending. However, a
serious scientist realizes that an explanation on that level is too shallow and not sufficient. It does not
mean that the Gorbachev factor loses its causal power, but there were much deeper causes, such as a
multitude of social problems, the overall crisis of the system, developed over a long period of socialist
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The same idea of causal depth can be applied in our case. To illustrate the importance of the idea of
causal depth, let us look at some explanations of the variations in the Post-Socialist bloc. For
example, Steven Fish also embarked on the question of variations in economic reforms across the
region (The Determinants of Economic Reform). The cultural explanation is identified by Fish as "an
underlying set of orientations determined by historical tradition" (39). The author concedes that there
exists perhaps "Christian verses non-Christian dichotomy" in terms of economic reforms. The
political-junctural explanation is found to be the most important, however, and "religion and
government type are explaining the bulk of variation" (54). With more regression analysis, religion
does not hold as a significant factor, leaving only the importance of the first elections as a factor of
successful reform adoption. But correlation does not mean causality. Can we really divorce so easily
cultural factors from economic and political performance? A social philosopher would say that Fish, in
fact, offers a shallow causal explanation, and there is not enough causal depth in his analysis inasmuch
as the outcome of the first elections may have been directly influenced by cultural and historical
circumstances. While many factors, such as, for example, political platform of the first election
winners may be quite important in explaining the speed of reform adoption, it does not adequately
explain the difference in the winners' political affiliation at the beginning. 
Similarly, Lipton (1990), Hellman (1998), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Sachs (1999) rightfully
maintain that path dependence is important: that is, initial institutional choices are important. Linz and
Stepan argue that presidential systems produce unstable semi-authoritarian democracies, and
parliamentary systems produce democracies (1996). That might be true, but why did some countries
choose a parliamentary system over presidentialism? That is exactly the question we have to look into,
and the Linz and Stepan explanation is therefore shallow, though might be true. The same goes for
Hellman's explanation of shock therapy adoption: it explains the variation in performance, but it does
not say anything why some countries adopted shock therapy while others did not! These analysts
assumes that all countries had (objective!) possibilities for transformation, and they do not explain
why some countries, for instance, liberalized their economies more rapidly or slowly. 
At the same time, it would not be right to stop at the geographical level of explanation only, because
the level does not offer an adequate causal mechanism through which isomorphism may occur. The
theory does, inasmuch as it identifies the four necessary conditions and further elaboration on the
mechanism. 
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Is there a counterpart of the theory of isomorphism in Political Science? Looking at some concepts in
Political Science, such as, for example, the Domino Theory, we see that the mechanism has been used
in political analyses before. The Domino Theory states that there would be a state isomorphism with
regard to countries responding to Communist takeover. It seems that the whole Eastern bloc just
swings towards dominant powers. 
The theory also remarkably reconciles two positions identified by Bunce comparativists and area
specialists (Regional Differences in Democratization). In fact, the theory leaves enough room for
both. It is exactly the question Bunce is asking "What precisely is the place of "place" in comparative
analysis?" To some extent, differences in democratization are perhaps generalizable taking into
account difference in the strength of isomorphism. 
An attack can be made that the theory is very deterministic. Perhaps, it is true; but it is determined by
the balance of power, as the Domino Theory already implies. Alice Amsden describes the situation
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Russia or the other populous sector of the USSR" (The Market Meets Its Match, 49). Undoubtedly,
there is the feel of it (the prospective policies from the West) in Eastern Europe and Russia. State
isomorphism is deterministic in so far as it is determined by the policies of the dominant powers. 
Of course, there are some outliers, such as Yugoslavia and Albania, which do not fit isomorphism
perfectly. No theory is entirely perfect, and it does not have to be, as Peter Blau would say (see the
epigraph). The task of this paper, however, is to show that the theory might be applied on a macro
(state) level, and that there is possible, however vague, applicability of the institutional theory to state
isomorphism, although it is still a question whether we can so easily equate states with organizations
and international state system with organizational field. Those generalizations are confined to and do
not go further than one particular historical experience: adoption of reforms during the transition
period within the post-Socialist bloc. 
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